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Abstract 
 
Family firms, which are prevalent around the world both for small organizations and large 
corporations, are usually more performant than other types of firms. This paper draws on 
altruism and on the theory of incentives contracting to explain why family firms perform 
better. Assuming that altruism only exists in family firms, we show that the strength of family 
ties has an impact on the optimal contract only under asymmetric information. Then, we 
extend the analysis to the principal-agent supervisor setting and prove that the recruitment of 
family members may be seen as a device against collusion within a three-tier hierarchy. 
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1 Introduction 
In the modern field of corporate finance, it is often assumed that widely-held corporations are 
prevalent, with ownership of capital dispersed between numerous small shareholders (Berle 
and Means, 1932). As a consequence, the modern corporation would be run by professional 
managers unaccountable to shareholders. While the image of a widely-held corporation has 
been used in theoretical developments on the theory of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
recent studies have cast doubt on this view by showing that there exist some forms of 
concentration of ownership in numerous countries. The insightful research of La Porta et alii 
(1999) about corporate ownership around the world indicates that there are few widely-held 
firms for most of the wealthy economies. 
 
        While it is often admitted that large firms are widely-held or controlled by government 
of financial institutions, La Porta et alii (1999) find instead that large corporations are mainly 
controlled by families, and family firms are the dominant form of business in numerous 
developed countries. Family control is more common in countries with good shareholder 
protection and little separation between ownership and management is observed in family 
firms. That the principal owner type of large corporations is the family is not in itself 
surprising. Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) also mention this prevalence of family firms, 
both for small enterprises and also for large corporations. In developing countries, it is well 
acknowledged that family firms are the bulk of the private economy. 
       What is the real place of family business  ? According to Gersick et alii (1997), the share 
of family business within worldwide business would be about 65-80%. For example, family 
business accounts for 40% of the GDP and 60% of the workforce in the United Sates. Family 
businesses also employ respectively 75% and 50% of the workforce in Germany and in 
Britain (for additional evidence on the prevalence of family firms, see Bhattacharya and 
Ravikumar (2001), Chami (2001), Gomez-Mejia et alii (2001) and the numerous references 
therein. Lotti and Santarelli (2002) focus on the survival of family firms )  . The evolution of 
the size of family businesses is more controversial. On the one hand, Bhattacharya and 
Ravikumar (2001) argue that the dominance of family firms diminishes as capital markets 
develop, as shown for instance by the decline of the large family firms in the United States. 
On the other hand, Allouche and Amann (1995) note that among the 1000 largest French 
firms, the number of family enterprises has decreased, but this decline has been accompanied 
by a greater size for each family firm and an increase in the contribution of family business to 
the overall business. 
       Thus, it seems a worthwhile issue to understand why family firms are still so important 
both in developed and developing countries. To our opinion, an argument based on the 
performance of family firms can be put forward. We believe that family firms (either owned 
or controlled) are more performing than other types of firms. From a theoretical perspective, 
one can argue that family firms should progressively disappear if they were less performing 
than other types of firm management. Using an evolutionary approach, less successful types 
of enterprises are ruled out given market competition, so that only efficient types prevail in 
the long run. 
        Empirical evidence favors the higher performance of family firms. Morck et alii (1988) 
show that a family control exerts a positive effect on Tobin's Q. Also, McConaughy et alii 
(1998) observe that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms, size and industry being 
held constant. Allouche and Amann (1995) indicate that the mean profitability is higher for 
family firms than nonfamily firms in France. Studying two subsamples of firms (family 
versus nonfamily) over the period 1989-1992, the authors find that measures of performance 
are always better for firms controlled by families. For example, the net profitability and the 
profit margin are respectively 3.1% and 5.4% for family firms, instead of 2.2% and 3.6% for 
nonfamily firms. Clearly, these results argue in favor of an increased efficiency for family 
business. 
        In spite of the prevalence of family firms over the world and the positive effect on 
economic performance, economic research about family business remains especially scarce. 
Recently, two papers have attempted to examine the role played by family firms and to 
provide theoretical microeconomic foundations for the specificity of family business. 
 
        On the one hand, Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) study the role of capital markets 
on the evolution of family business, by focusing on the timing of selling a family firm.  
Family business is modeled as a household operating a production technology, and human 
capital is a fixed factor of production which can be transferred down the generations. On the 
evolution of family firms, see also Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2002). Assuming an 
altruistic bequest motive (see Becker, 1991), the household can sell the business firm at any 
point in time using primary capital markets, but it does not have any private benefits of 
control. Hence, in economies with less developed primary capital markets, one expects a 
greater size and a longer duration for family business. On the other hand, Chami (2001) 
considers a setting with an altruistic parent and a child working for the family firm. The 
child's effort level is supposed to be private information, and this gives rise to a serious moral 
hazard problem. Chami (2001) points out the role of trust between family members as an 
efficiency enhancing mechanism, since it mitigates the moral hazard problem, and notes that 
the succession in family firms from the parent to one child leads the child to internalize part of 
the moral hazard. 
 
          The key feature of these studies on family business is the presence of altruism between 
family members. According to Becker (1991), an altruistic parent cares for the well-being of 
his selfish child and transfers income flow from the least to the most financially needy 
generation, independently of any present or future reciprocating help. Our interest in altruism 
concerns the focus on the specificity of family relationships, further discussed in Laferrère 
and Wolff (2004). Given frequent and repeated interactions between family members, the 
strength of family ties is more likely to involve cooperative behaviors. Reputation and 
opportunities for future punishment are also expected to favor cooperation within the family. 
As a consequence, altruistic feelings owing to family ties would have a positive effect on the 
agency problems which may occur in environment characterized by imperfect information 
between agents. 
         Some studies have recently examined the positive effect of altruism in the setting of the 
firm. Mulligan (1997) proposes a principal-agent problem with an endogenously loyal agent. 
Since a loyal agent exerts higher effort level because he cares about the wellbeing of the 
principal, the principal has incentive to make their agents loyal. Rotemberg (1994) shows that 
altruism tends to raise productivity when employees work as a team. The presence of strategic 
complementarily between actions by agent and principal breeds altruism. The beneficial role 
of trust is put forward by Fukuyama (1995), who indicates that cooperation is needed for the 
success of large firms. Clearly, trust enhances efficiency and profitability of firms, with lower 
monitoring expenditures (Allouche and Amann, 1998, Chami and Fullenkamp, 1999, James, 
1999). The effect of trust on performance of large organizations appears significant and 
quantitatively large (La Porta et alii, 1997). 
 
             In this paper , we intent to show that the strength of family ties may explain the 
superior performance of family firms. Following previous research on family business, we 
consider that the central distinction between family and non-family firms is the presence of 
altruism in the former case. Then, we investigate the role of altruism and wonder whether 
successful family firms may be due to the reducing impact of family relationships on the 
agency problems that occur in the business environment. We demonstrate that family 
members may have an advantage in monitoring production activities, so that family firms 
become more performant (see also the discussion in Fama and Jensen, 1983). Specifically, we 
use the microeconomic theory of incentives contracting to provide foundations for the greatest 
performance of family business as the result of rational decisions of utility maximizing 
agents. We demonstrate that both altruism and informational aspects play a role to explain 
why family firms perform better .Although there have been some attempts to account both for 
agency problems and altruism in the theory of the firm (Harvey, 1999, Jensen, 1994, Schulze 
et alii, 2003, Van der Berghe, 2003), these studies which mainly deal with organizational 
aspects do not formally demonstrate the prevalence of family business. Also, they do not 
elaborate on the complex interrelationships between altruism and agency theory. 
 
         The novelty of our paper is to disentangle the effects of altruism and information in a 
formalized framework. For that purpose, we begin by considering a simple production 
problem with one principal and one agent, which may be a family member or a stranger. With 
a family member, the principal cares for the agent's welfare in the maximization problem. We 
prove that the optimal contract is neutral with respect to altruism in a setting of perfect 
information. However, when relaxing this assumption, we demonstrate that a family firm 
should perform better since the informational rent is less costly for the principal under 
altruism. Then, we extend the analysis to the case of a three-layer hierarchical structure using 
the model developed in Tirole (1986, 1992), but consider the case of continuous types of 
agents and explicitly account for the cost of side contract. We demonstrate the interest of 
hiring family members in the deserving combat against collusion within the firm. 
 
       The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
production problem with one parent as a principal and an agent who manages the firm, and 
characterize the optimal contract under symmetric information. This assumption is relaxed in 
section 3, where we investigate the role of altruism on the informational rent in a family firm. 
In section 4, we extend the problem to the supervisor-principal-agent paradigm and study the 
case of a contract with no collusion. We examine the pattern of optimal collusion under 
perfect information in section 5. The problem of collusion with side payment under imperfect 
information is described in section 6. Concluding comments are in section 7. 
 
 2 Labor Contract under Symmetric Information 
2.1 The production problem 
We begin our analysis of family firms by considering a simple production problem with two 
agents, a principal and an agent. The principal is the ownership of a firm which is managed by 
the agent. The latter may be a family member (an insider), but the principal may also hire an 
agent who does not belong to the family (an outsider). 
 
       The central assumption in our paper is that the difference between family firms and non-
family firms is linked to the strength of family ties between the principal and the agent. When 
the principal hires a non-family member, he has no prior information on  this individual and 
thus he behaves in a perfectly egoistic way. Therefore, he only seeks to maximize the 
expected profit resulting from production. Conversely, with a family member, we admit that 
the principal behaves in a benevolent way. Following the altruistic hypothesis made famous 
by Becker (1974, 1991), this implies that the principal derives some satisfaction from the 
agent's level of well-being. 
 
       It is well known that the introduction of altruism affects the allocation of resources within 
the family. As described in Laferrère and Wolff (2004), the main prediction of the altruism 
model for intergenerational redistribution is that when parent and child are linked by positive 
transfers, redistributing at the margin income from the parent to the child is completely 
neutralized by a transfer in the opposite direction. This neutrality property is the basis of 
Ricardian equivalence, so that public transfers are expected to totally crowd out private family 
transfers under altruism and interior solutions . From an empirical viewpoint, this prediction is 
not supported by microeconomics data when looking at the provision of transfers to children 
(Altonji et alii, 1997). Nevertheless, less strong implications of altruism are clearly verified. 
Usually, the probability and amount of transfers are positively related to parent's income and 
negatively related to child's income (see Laferrère and Wolff, 2004). Also, when looking at 
the distribution of transfers among siblings, one observes that financial gifts are more likely to 
go to the less well-off children (Dunn and Phillips, 1997, McGarry and Schoeni, 1995, 1997). 
   
          Interestingly, in the field of intergenerational transfers, some papers have recently 
attempted to relax the prevalent assumption of perfect information. Chami (1996, 1998) 
proves that labor market conditions exert an influence upon the type and level of transfers 
provided by parents to their children. Also, the fact that parents are unable to perfectly 
observe the amount of child's effort explains why altruistic parents have a preference for late 
bequests rather than early financial inter vivos gifts (Cremer and Pestieau, 1998). Drawing on 
a model of coresidence and transfers to children, Jellal and Wolff (2003) show that when 
parents do not perfectly know the privacy cost of their children in home-sharing, they make 
additional transfers in order to discipline their children and provide them with incentives to 
reveal their true privacy cost. The predictions of the altruistic model are affected in a context 
of imperfect information. When the child's income reacts to the transfer, the neutrality 
property may eventually break down, depending on the information of parent and child about 
each other's preferences and endowment. For an overview, see Laferrère and Wolff (2004). 
 
         The link between family altruism and agency problems lies at the heart of our analysis. 
It has been suggested that altruism makes family memberships more valuable in a way that 
sustain the bond among them (see Eshel et alii, 1998). As a consequence, one can be 
confident that altruism should have an impact in the domain of family firms. As pointed out 
by Simon (1993, p. 160), “appropriate attention to altruism, especially organizational 
identification, substantially changes the theory of the firm”. The novelty of our paper is to 
focus on the interplay between altruism and information structure to explain why family firms 
perform better. Thus, our contribution is one of the first formal attempt to account for altruism 
in the growing domain of family firms, Chami (2001) and Bhattacharya and Ravikumar 
(2001, 2002) between noticeable exceptions. 
 
        So, let us consider the following model of adverse selection characterized by a complete 
centralization of information. Let 𝑞 be the level of output realized by the agent, which is an 
indicator of the agent's performance on the market. In terms of satisfaction, the value of q 
units of production for the principal is given by the function  𝑞 . We make the usual 
assumptions that the function v(q) is continuous, three-times differentiable and concave, i.e. 
v’(q) > 0 and v”(q) ≤ 0 . When participating in the production activity q, the agent supports a 
cost denoted by 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞  where θ is an indicator of the type of agent. A more efficient agent is 
characterized by a lower value for the parameter θ. We assume that c(θ, q) is common 
knowledge, but the cost parameter θ is only known privately to the agent. Unless otherwise, 
the parameter θ can take on any value in the closed interval denoted by Ω, with Ω = [𝜃 , 𝜃]. 
The parameter θ of efficiency type is modeled as the realization of a random variable with 
distribution F(θ) and corresponding density function f(θ), both defined over the support Ω. 
We assume that the parameter θ satisfies the following conditions. 
 
Assumptions  
(A1)
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞)
𝜕𝜃
> 0, (A2) 
𝜕²𝑐(𝜃 ,𝑞)
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞
> 0, (A3) 
𝜕²𝑐(𝜃 ,𝑞)
𝜕𝑞²
> 0, (A4) 
𝜕²𝑐(𝜃 ,𝑞)
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 ²
≥ 0 and
𝜕²𝑐(𝜃 ,𝑞)
𝜕𝜃 ²𝜕𝑞
≥
0 , (A5) 
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
 ≥ 0. 
 
 
Assumption 1 is the monotonicity condition, so that 𝜃  corresponds to the most efficient type 
of agent. Assumption 2 is the single crossing property, which is a sufficient condition for the 
local and global conditions for incentive compatibility. Assumption 3 is a convexity 
condition, and assumption 4 includes sufficient conditions to solve the principal's 
optimization problem. Finally, assumption 5 may be seen as a decreasing returns assumption. 
The monotone hazard rate for F is a standard condition in the incentive contracting theory 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
 
         The principal's problem is to design a compensation structure that maximizes his 
expected profit, while guaranteeing the agent a transfer at least equal to his reservation wage 
for all realization of θ. Without loss of generality, the agent's reservation wage is normalized 
to zero. Let q(θ) be the agent's level of output when θ is realized. We denote by w(θ) the 
corresponding wage payment from the principal to the agent. Finally, we consider a linear 
utility function for the agent, which is given by  u(θ) = w(θ) − c(θ, q). 
 
2.2 The Symmetric Information Case 
It does seem reasonable that principals will have better information (or at least some prior 
beliefs) about the characteristics of family members than they do about the characteristics of 
strangers. But even in presence of family members, it is also clear that the asymmetric 
information which may result from the agent's possibility to dissimulate his true type does not 
really disappear. As we will show, this is the joint role of family altruism and private 
information which explains why family firms are expected to perform better. Nevertheless, 
we first examine the case of symmetric information between the principal and the agent 
(either insider or outsider). Although this may appear as a very restrictive setting, certainly 
unrealistic in the context of a production problem, it allows us to disentangle the role of 
information and altruism on the performance of firms. 
 
        Our purpose in this subsection is to investigate how the identity of the agent, either a 
family member or an outsider, affects the optimal contract under symmetric information. This 
assumption simply means that the labor contract is necessarily the first-best. Recalling that the 
central difference between a family firm and a non-family firm is only linked to altruistic 
considerations with respect to the agent, this implies two different maximization programs, 
depending on the type of firm (or equivalently depending on the agent's identity, outsider or 
insider). 
  
Let us begin with the standard case of a principal which hires an outsider. Hence, he does not 
behave in a benevolent way, and the egoistic principal seeks to maximize the level of profit 
function Π subject to the individual rationality (IR) constraint. In that case, the maximization 
program 𝑃0 for the principal is : 
  Max
𝑞 . ,𝑤(.)
Π = 𝑣 𝑞(𝜃 ) − 𝑤(𝜃) 
         (𝑃0)                                       s.t      𝑤 𝜃 −  𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞 𝜃  ≥ 0        (IR)                   (1)              
                                                                   
According to the IR participation constraint, the wage received by the agent should at least 
compensate the cost involved by the production process. 
 
       Now, we turn to the case of an insider. Since the principal is altruistic, we denote by β the 
corresponding caring parameter, with 0 < β < 1.If β > 1, the altruistic principal would give 
more or equal weight to the agent's marginal utility than to his own. In a dynamic setting, it is 
well known that such cases lead to non-bounded dynastic utility. 
This parameter is a measure of the weight attached to the agent's utility in the principal's 
objective function. Hence, the maximization program P1 for a family firm can be expressed 
as : 
  Max  
𝑞 . ,𝑤(.)
∑ = 𝑣 𝑞(𝜃 ) − 𝑤 𝜃 + 𝛽𝑢 
         (𝑃1)                                  s.t      𝑢 = 𝑤 𝜃 −  𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞 𝜃  ≥ 0        (IR)                 (2)              
 
where Σ indicates the family level of well-being. The difference between 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 is related 
to the presence of altruistic feelings towards the agent when the latter is a family member. 
Clearly, when the altruistic parameter is equal to 0, the program 𝑃1 is equivalent to 𝑃0 . For 
the sake of comparison, we make the implicit assumption that both types of agents (insider 
and outsider) are characterized by the same productivity parameter θ. We can now prove that 
in a setting of symmetric information, altruism plays no role in the determination of the 
optimal contract. 
 
Proposition 1  
Under symmetric information, the optimal contract does not depend on the agent's identity, 
outsider or insider. In both cases, the first-best contract is given by: 
i)   𝑣 ′ 𝑞(𝜃) =
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞∗(𝜃))
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 
     ii)            w*(θ) = c(θ, q*(θ)) 
Proof:  
Let us first assume that the agent is an outsider. In that case, from the Lagrangian associated 
to 𝑃0 (𝜆0  being the multiplicator of Lagrange), 
ℒ0 = v(q(θ)) − w(θ) + 𝜆0. [w(θ) − c(θ, q(θ))] 
we deduce from the first-order condition ∂ℒ0/∂w = 0 that −1+𝜆0   = 0. Since 𝜆0 = 1 > 0, it 
implies that w(θ) = c(θ, q(θ)). As a consequence, we get ℒ0 = v(q(θ)) − c(θ, q(θ)), so that the 
optimal production obtained by 𝑣′ 𝑞(𝜃) =
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞∗(𝜃))
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
. 
Now, if the agent is an insider, the optimal solution given by the program 𝑃1  is obtained 
through the Lagrangian     ℒ1     (𝜆1 being the corresponding multiplicator ) : 
 
     ℒ1   = v(q(θ)) − w(θ) + β [w(θ) − c(θ, q(θ))] + 𝜆1 [w(θ) − c(θ, q(θ))] 
 
Hence, from the first-order condition ∂ℒ1/∂w = 0 , we deduce that −1 + β + 𝜆1  = 0. Since 𝜆1  
= −β + 1 > 0 and recalling that β < 1 by definition of altruistic preferences, we obtain again 
𝜆1  > 0 and then w(θ) − c(θ, q(θ)) = 0. The Lagrangian ℒ1  becomes ℒ1= v(q(θ)) − c(θ, q(θ)), 
which implies 𝑣 ′ 𝑞(𝜃) =
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞∗(𝜃))
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
. . QED 
 
           Let us interpret this proposition, which indicates that the type of contract is the same 
for both types of firms. From the definition of the first-best contract (w∗, q∗), we observe  that 
the marginal benefit v’(q∗(θ)) is equal to the marginal cost ∂c(θ,q∗(θ))/∂q . Also, the cost of 
production c(θ, q∗(θ)) is equal to the compensation w∗(θ) for θ ∈ Ω. An additional comment 
is that there is no rent for the agent. Indeed, the participation constraint is binding for all types 
θ of agents at the equilibrium, both in family and non-family firms. Proposition 1 is a very 
important contribution with respect to the literature on family business. Assuming that the 
principal is able to have perfect information on the agent, we prove that introducing altruism 
in the production problem does not matter for the optimal contract. Thus, altruism itself is not 
sufficient to explain why family firms perform better. 
 
        Nevertheless, in the modern theory of production, the prevalent setting is that principals 
have only imperfect information on the agents' behavior (see Laffont and Tirole,1993). We 
now relax the assumption of perfect information in our production problem and prove that 
both altruistic feelings and informational asymmetry explain why performance in family firms 
is different from performance in other types of firms. 
 
 
3 Labor Contract under Asymmetric Information 
We now turn to the case where the principal is induced to hire an agent who is characterized 
by unknown preferences. Considering that the agent is in a position to dissimulate some 
characteristics which are likely to affect his own performance is standard in such setting. The 
assumption of asymmetric information is well acknowledged when the principal hires an 
outsider. But despites of the strength of family ties, it is also clear that information revelation 
due to long-term family relationships is unable to perfectly operate. As claimed in Fama and 
Jensen (1983), altruism exposes family firms to adverse selection. The consequences of 
accounting for imperfect information in the context of family relationships have recently been 
examined (Chami, 1996, 1998, Gatti, 2000, Jellal and Wolff, 2003, Villanueva, 2001). We 
extend these developments to the production framework by investigating the role of altruism 
on the second-best contract. 
 
3.1 The second-best contract with an outsider 
We first consider that the principal hires an outsider which has private information on his 
productivity parameter θ. The principal knows that it is in the interest of the manager to hide 
this information. 
        While the principal is unable to observe the type of agent θ, we make the assumption that 
the principal has information about the range of efficiency parameters θ ∈ [θ; θ], and also 
about the associated distribution F(θ). Given the presence of asymmetric information, the 
principal's maximization program is affected. If the ownership attempts to implement the fist 
best solution described in proposition 1, the agent has an incentive to overstate the parameter 
θ in order to obtain an informational rent. Hence, in the design of the optimal contract, the 
principal is constrained to make contracts menu contingent on variables that are verifiable and 
observable to both parties. In our simple setting, the optimal contract is made contingent on 
the level of production.From the literature on incentive contracting and the revelation 
principle (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), one can restrict the search to the class of mechanisms 
that induces a truthful revelation of the agent's parameter θ. In the context of our model, any 
optimal mechanism M that induces a truthful reporting can be represented as : 
                                   M =< q(θ),w(θ) >Ω                                                  (3) 
The principal offers a menu of type-revealing contracts with the definitions of q(θ) and w(θ), 
and the agent is expected to choose one of these self-selection contracts. Considering a 
mechanism M(θ), let u(𝜃 ,θ) be the net level of satisfaction that is achieved by an agent of type 
θ if he reports the type 𝜃 . Without loss of generality, the reservation payoff is set to zero. 
 Hence, the rent u(𝜃 ,θ)  for the agent is : 
                                               u(𝜃 ,θ) = w(𝜃 ) − c(θ, q(𝜃 ))                                            (4) 
Finally, we denote by u(θ) = u(θ,θ) the situation according to which the efficiency type of the 
agent is truthfully reported. 
 
          Under asymmetric information, there are two constraints in the determination of the 
principal's maximization program. Firstly, the requirement of truthful reporting gives the 
incentive compatibility constraint (IC) such that u(θ) ≥ u(𝜃 ,θ). Secondly, imposing the 
condition of individual rationality (IR), we have u(θ) ≥ 0. Thus, the principal's problem 
denoted by 𝑃0
𝐴 (A stands for asymmetric information) is given by the maximization of his 
expected utility given the distribution function F(θ) under the incentive compatibility and the 
individual rationality constraints : 
 
𝑃0
𝐴
 
 
 Max𝑞 . ,𝑤 .   𝑣 𝑞 𝜃  − 𝑤 𝜃  .𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
𝑠. 𝑡  𝑢 𝜃 ≥ 𝑢 𝜃 , 𝜃                       IC 
        𝑢 𝜃 =  𝑢 𝜃, 𝜃 ≥ 0              IR 
                                                             (5) 
We begin by a characterization of the class of contracts that satisfies the incentive 
compatibility constraint in order to implement the allocation < q(θ), w(θ) > in a dominant 
strategy. 
 
Proposition 2  
The second-best contract < q(θ), w(θ) > in a non-family firm satisfies the incentive constraint 
IC if and only if : 
i) 𝑢 𝜃 =  
𝜕𝑐 𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃
 𝑑𝑥 
ii) 𝑞′ 𝜃 ≤ 0  ,  ∀𝜃 ∈ Ω 
 
Proof:  
From the definition of u(θ) such that : 
u(θ) =  sup  u(𝜃 ,θ) = w(𝜃 ) − c(θ, q(𝜃 ))                                             
           𝜃 ∈Ω 
u(θ) is an upper envelope of a linear function in θ, then it is convex and we have almost 
everywhere using the envelope theorem : 
𝑢′ 𝜃 =  −
𝜕𝑐(𝜃, 𝑞 𝜃 )
𝜕𝜃
< 0 
𝑢′′  𝜃 =  −
𝜕2𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞
𝑞′(𝜃) 
The necessary condition for a maximum is 𝑢′′  𝜃 ≥ 0. Since ∂²c(θ, q(θ))/∂θ∂q ≥ 0 holds from 
assumption 2, we have 𝑢′′  𝜃 ≥ 0 if and only if : q’(θ) ≤ 0. 
Finally, one obtains u(θ) by integration of u’(θ) such that u(𝜃) = 0, which corresponds to the 
informational rent left to the type θ ∈ Ω. QED 
 
        Because of asymmetric information about the agent's ability parameter θ, the principal is 
forced to give up a costly rent to the agent which is used to discipline the agent into revealing 
his true efficiency type. In addition, the rent u(θ) is a decreasing function of the efficiency 
parameter θ. Hence, to be willing to reveal the agent's true type, the lower θ-type of agent 
must be rewarded with a more important rent value than the higher θ-type. The monotonicity 
condition q’(θ) ≤ 0 also implies a lower level of performance for inefficient agents in order to 
extract informational rent .Indeed , using assumption 2 (single crossing property), we get : 
                     
𝜕
𝜕𝑞
𝑢 𝜃 =  
𝜕²𝑐 𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑞
𝜃
𝜃
 𝑑𝑥 > 0 
           Let us describe the components q(θ) and w(θ) of the optimal contract M(θ). We begin 
by the calculation of the wage level w(θ). Given the definition of the agent's utility u(θ) = 
w(θ) − c(θ, q(θ)), we obtain the following expression : 
                                 w(θ) = c(θ, q(θ)) +  
𝜕𝑐  𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃
 𝑑𝑥                                           (6) 
 
Now, we can insert this wage w(θ) in the profit function of the principal. Then, given the 
definition of the informational rent and integrating by parts, the expected profit denoted by 
EΠ becomes accordingly : 
                   𝐸Π =   𝑣 𝑞 𝜃  − 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞(𝜃 ) −  
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃) 
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
                            (7) 
 
so that the principal's problem is to maximize EΠ subject to the monotonicity constraint q’(θ) 
≤ 0. 
 
Proposition 3  
Under asymmetric information, the optimal contract for a non-family firm satisfies the 
following equalities : 
i)      𝑣 ′ 𝑞(𝜃) =
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃))
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+ 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃) 
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 
 ii)    w(θ)  =  c(θ, q(θ)) + 
𝜕𝑐  𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃
 𝑑𝑥  
Proof: 
 From the unconstrained optimization problem (7), we deduce from the corresponding first-
order condition that v‟(𝑞 𝜃 ) −
𝜕𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞
−
𝐹 𝜃 
𝑓 𝜃 
𝜕𝑐  𝜃 ,𝑞 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞
= 0 . Part i) of proposition 3 is 
given by the transfer in the equation (6). 
 
          Now, we have to show that the previous solution satisfies the monotonicity constraint 
defined by q’(θ) ≤ 0. Let Γ(θ, q(θ))  be a function such that : 
                        Γ(θ, q(θ)) =  𝑣′(𝑞 𝜃 ) −
𝜕𝑐  𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞
−
F θ 
f θ 
∂²c θ,q θ  
∂θ ∂q
 
Thus, we have    sgn  (q’(θ) )  = sgn   
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝜃
 (𝜃, 𝑞(𝜃)   . We get the following derivative : 
𝜕Γ
𝜕𝜃
  𝜃, 𝑞 𝜃  = −
𝜕𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞(𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞𝜕𝜃
−
𝐹 𝜃 
𝑓 𝜃 
𝜕𝑐3𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃2𝜕𝑞
−
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(
F θ 
f θ 
)
∂²c θ, q θ  
∂θ ∂q
 
Clearly, we have ∂Γ(θ,q(θ))/∂θ ≤ 0 because of assumptions 2, 4 and 5, so that the 
monotonicity condition is satisfied. QED 
 
            It is now possible to draw a more complete description of the production process. 
Clearly, the second-best level of output under asymmetric information is lower than the first-
best level. The explanation concerning the distortion in q(θ) is that the imitation of inefficient 
types by efficient agents is undesirable. When the principal reduces the level of production, an 
agent of type θ finds it less favorable to mimic the type 𝜃 . 
 
3.2 The Second-Best Contract with an Insider 
To compare the relative performance of non-family and family firms, we turn to the case of an 
insider. This modifies the principal's maximization program, since he now accounts for the 
well-being of the agent instead of focusing on the pure profit. 
 
         When the manager (a family member) has private information on the productivity 
parameter θ, the optimal contract is again made contingent on the level of production and any 
optimal mechanism M inducing a truthful reporting is given by M =<q(θ),w(θ) >Ω. Recalling 
that the principal seeks to maximize the augmented utility Σ = Π+βu with Π = v(q(θ))−w(θ) 
and u = w(θ)−c(θ, q(θ)), we can express the objective function Σ as: 
                                   Σ = v(q(θ)) − c(θ, q(θ)) − (1 − β)u                                            (8) 
The interpretation of the last term is as follows. In (8), the term (1 − β) may be seen as the 
weight devoted to the costly rent u left to the agent owing to private information. When the 
principal is characterized by a very high degree of altruism with respect to the agent, the 
parameter β is close to one and the cost of the rent for the principal tends to be very low. 
 
          In this setting, the principal's problem denoted by 𝑃1
𝐴 is given by the maximization of 
the following expected utility, again subject to the incentive compatibility and the individual 
rationality constraints: 
  𝑃1
𝐴
 
 
 Max𝑞 . ,𝑤 .   𝑣(𝑞(𝜃))  −  𝑐(𝜃, 𝑞(𝜃))  −  (1 −  𝛽)𝑢 𝜃  . 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
𝑠. 𝑡  𝑢 𝜃 ≥ 𝑢 𝜃 , 𝜃                       IC 
        𝑢 𝜃 =  𝑢 𝜃, 𝜃 ≥ 0              IR 
                          (9) 
 
 
so that implementing the allocation < q(θ), w(θ) > in a dominant strategy leads to the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4  
Under asymmetric information and given family altruism, the optimal contract for an insider 
is given by : 
i)    𝑣 ′ 𝑞(𝜃) =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃))
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+  1 − 𝛽 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃) 
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 
 ii)   w(θ)  =  c(θ, q(θ)) +  
𝜕𝑐  𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃
 𝑑𝑥  
 
Proof:  
It is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.  QED 
To interpret this result, we note that part ii) of proposition 4 can be expressed as : 
𝑣 ′ 𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛽
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃) 
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃))
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞(𝜃) 
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
                               (10) 
 
The left hand side of (10) is the marginal benefit in terms of family utility, while the right 
hand side corresponds to the marginal cost of production which accounts for the costly rent. 
With respect to the case of a non-family firm, the marginal benefit is now higher and the 
magnitude of its increase depends on the value of the caring parameter β > 0 , this case is then 
a generalization of the previous subsection, an outsider being characterized by a caring 
parameter β = 0. When choosing the optimal level of production, the altruistic principal which 
operates in a family firm accounts for an additional altruistic marginal benefit, so that he is 
induced to set a higher level of production. Interestingly, in the case of perfect altruism (β = 
1), one can note that the optimal allocation is given by its first-best value v’(q(θ)) = 
∂c(θ,q(θ))/ ∂q . In that case, altruism perfectly neutralizes the adverse effect of asymmetric 
information.  
 
Corollary 1  
Under asymmetric information, the optimal contract depends on the agent's identity (insider 
or outsider), and family firms perform better. 
 
          This results stands in contrast with the case of symmetric information, where altruistic 
feelings between the agent and the principal did not influence the optimal contract . As one 
relaxes the assumption of perfect information, agents are expected to receive informational 
rent, so that the principal is more likely to leave the costly rent to the agent within a family 
firm since altruism decreases the marginal cost of the rent. As long as β > 0 (and assuming 
that both the insider and the outsider are characterized by the same value for θ), it follows that 
a higher level of production is expected from a family agent. 
          So, the main conclusion of this section is that under asymmetric information, a family 
firm should be more performant because of altruism. Importantly, this is the combination of 
altruism and imperfect information which gives rise to the superiority of family business. The 
recruitment of family members is then a self-selection device given the structure of 
information between the principal and the agent and the particular form of preferences for 
family members. In so doing, the ownership of a firm is expected to increase the firm's 
profitability, depending on the strength of family ties. 
 
 
4 Labor Contract with Delegation 
While the principal-agent setting is relevant for small family firms (for instance when the 
agent is a worker or with sharecropping contracts), it is important for larger corporations to 
account for their hierarchical structure. In that case, family members have a role to play in 
family business, dealing with supervisory tasks : the ownership may recruit a family member 
as the supervisor of a firm with an external manager. We now extend our analysis to the case 
of a three-layer hierarchy and examine how the information structure affects the performance 
of family firms. 
          Following the insightful contributions of Tirole (1986) and Laffont (1990), we extend 
the principal-agent model by including a third party, the supervisor. This situation, in which 
the principal is able to acquire information about the agent from the supervisor's report, gives 
rise to the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and the agent in order to manipulate 
the information sent to the principal. We assume that the principal is the ownership of a firm, 
the supervisor may be a family member or an outsider, and the agent is the manager of the 
firm. There are two possibilities for the supervisor. He may either be a family member whose 
preferences are known to the principal or a nonfamily member with unknown preferences. In 
the latter case, the supervisor's degree of honesty is unobservable, but the principal anticipates 
that the supervisor is tempted to collude with the agent. The structure of the model is as 
follows. 
         The principal is interested in controlling the agent's activity. He wants to have 
information about the type of agent, given by the efficiency parameter θ. So, the principal 
hires a supervisor to monitor the action of the agent and the principal offers a contract to the 
supervisor to discipline the agent. Before contracting takes place, the supervisor learns the 
type of agent. The role of the supervisor is to make a report to the principal, whose content is 
a valuable source of information for the principal. Then, the supervisor receives a payment 
which depends on the report made to the principal. The role of the supervisor is linked to the 
definition of an imperfect technology on verifiable information about the type of agent 
(Tirole, 1986, Laffont and Rochet, 1997).Since monitoring activities are too costly for the 
principal, the use of the technology has to be delegated to an intermediary who must be given 
appropriate incentives. 
 
         The report, which indicates the type of agent (less or more efficient), may be untruthful 
if the supervisor and the agent agree to collude. The report can only be untruthful if the two 
previous parties agree on sending a falsified report to the principal (see Kofman and Lawarée, 
1993). When collusion occurs, it is accompanied by a covert transfer from the agent to the 
supervisor. This transfer is part of an enforceable side contract between the supervisor and the 
agent. This contract includes the amount of covert transfer which is transferred from the agent 
to the supervisor. We denote by σ the state of information obtained by the supervisor about 
the type of agent, characterized by the parameter θ. Following Tirole (1986), we assume that 
the signal σ is hard information. This means that if σ = θ ∈ Ω and the supervisor reveals the 
signal to the principal, then it is convincing evidence. Now, let r be the supervisor's report to 
the principal. Hence, the report is defined by r ∈ {σ; ∅}. On the one hand, when σ = ∅, the 
supervisor learns nothing about the type of agent, so that the supervisor can only report that he 
has no information. On the other hand, when σ = θ, the supervisor observes the true type of 
agent θ. Hence, according to his own preferences, the supervisor can either tell the truth r = θ 
to the principal or send a falsified report r = ∅. Concealing information is a degree of 
discretion for the supervisor. 
 
           Now, let ζ be the probability that the supervisor gets information about the true type of 
agent θ ∈ Ω. With probability 1−ζ, the supervisor observes nothing. The probabilities are such 
that Pr(σ = θ ∈ Ω) = ζ and Pr(σ = ∅) = 1−ζ. In this delegation game, we denote the 
supervisor's utility function by the following function : 
                                                   V (s) = s                                                                          (11) 
where s is the wage received by the supervisor for a given effort of investigation, again, the 
reservation wage is normalized to zero. 
 
         When the supervisor observes the true value σ = θ ∈ Ω, the agent has an incentive to 
collude with the supervisor. When the agent is discovered with evidence, he is expected to 
offer a side contract to the supervisor in exchange of the dissimulation of the true parameter θ 
(see Tirole, 1986). The agent bribes the supervisor to convince the supervisor to conceal his 
information and report instead that he has observed nothing, i.e. r = ∅.To suppress reporting, 
the side contract specifies an amount of covert transfer b from the agent to the supervisor. 
When the supervisor accepts the side contract, we assume that he faces a psychological cost 
given by the parameter ψ. Such formalization is novel with respect to the existing literature on 
mechanism design. 
          Clearly, we account in our setting for the place of moral values in preference systems. 
In economic theory, a standard approach is to assume that agents feel moral disutility when 
they attempt to infringe social conventions. Morality can directly enter into the individual's 
utility function through negative feelings or be incorporated by the use of lexical preferences. 
In Besley and McLaren (1993), honest agents never accept bribes and they regard their 
integrity as priceless. Also, Andvig and Moene (1990) consider the presence of a psychic cost 
in terms of guilt and moral disgust when acting against the moral convention. More honest 
people are expected to get more disutility from bribery, since they attach a greater weight to 
the costs associated with collusion and the possibility of personal disgrace if caught. With 
bribery between the supervisor and the agent, the supervisor's utility is : 
                                                 V = b − ψ                                                                        (12) 
When the supervisor is an insider (a family member), the principal has a precise idea on the 
degree of the psychic cost ψ. Indeed, due to family values, transmissions of attitudes and 
educational efforts, the parameter ψ may be seen as the outcome of preference shaping 
behavior. In the study of intergenerational transmission mechanisms, the role of the parents in 
the formation of the children's outcome has been widely shown. A first channel deals with the 
role of both genetical and cultural transmission, so that a child is more likely to behave as his 
parents. Parents influence the experiences of their children during the formative early years, 
and adult behaviors are then strongly correlated with childhood experiences (see Becker, 
1993, 1996, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Jellal and Wolff, 2002, Mulligan, 1997). A second 
channel occurs through human capital transmission (Becker and Tomes, 1986, Behrman et 
alii, 1995). Parents devote a lot of financial and time-related resources to the child's 
education, so that they can observe during many years the effort at school of the progeny and 
whether children obtain good results. It follows that a higher value for ψ indicates a more 
honest and loyal behavior.For an insightful investigation of the role of guilt, shame, and 
norms within the firm, see Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Lazear (1995). Guilt and shame 
provide effort incentives. A polar case is given by ψ = +∞, which is equivalent to a 
guaranteed perfect honesty. This parameter ψ may be interpreted as a discounted loss of 
reputation or disinheritance for the supervisor. The role of honesty-shared values in family 
firms is closely related to the recent and growing literature on endogenous preferences (see 
Becker, 1996, Bowles, 1998, Mulligan, 1997). In the family context, parents attempt to instill 
desirable values in their children. By influencing the experiences of the children during the 
formative early years, parents also affect adult preferences and choices due to habits acquired 
in childhood. Then, parents have to account for the connection between childhood 
experiences and adult children when they inculcate moral values into the children. For 
example, according to Akerlof (1983) and Frank (1988), the best way to appear altruistic is to 
actually behave in an altruistic way, so that such a genuine altruism is likely to rub off on the 
children. Instilling guilt in children is expected to influence both work effort and other types 
of behavior (Weinberg, 2001). Favoring honesty and loyalty is a worthwhile issue since it is 
the major factor in the success of family firms. For a given identity of the supervisor, the 
timing of the labor contract in the three-layer hierarchy is given by the following sequence : 
i)the agent learns privately θ, the supervisor learns σ, and the agent also learns σ ; 
ii) the principal offers the supervisor and the agent a grand contract, which is a mechanism 
specifying   < q, w, s >Ω; 
iii) the agent and the supervisor can sign a side contract specifying a side transfer, which 
depends on the message and report by the agent and the supervisor in the context of the grand 
contract ; 
iv) contracts are implemented. 
 
         As a benchmark case, we study the case of a contract with no collusion. Thus, we 
determine the optimal grand contract when the principal has a “super-supervisor”. Such a 
supervisor is characterized by a flat income s = 0 and the saint-supervisor always reports 
truthfully. Such a situation would correspond to the case of a perfectly inculcated family 
member . For example, a parent may devote a huge amount of time-related and financial 
resources to give his child a strict education. With this transmission of moral values, a child 
would be expected to behave as an incorruptible supervisor. Also, the supervisor may be 
concerned with the transmission of his wealth or with the sale of the firm, so that he is 
induced to keep a more performant firm. Owning a family firm is part of a long-term 
(dynastic) capital strategy. When preference shaping succeeds, the cost of collusion is given 
by the value ψ = +∞. In this situation, the ownership of a family business would certainly 
place an important demand for having children, since this allows the principal to have a 
perfect control on the firm's management. Efforts in preference shaping behavior translate 
into a higher prosperity for the family business. 
 
Proposition 5  
When the principal hires a saint-supervisor, decentralization of information dominates 
centralization. 
Proof :  
When there is no supervisor, the expected profit for the firm is given by : 
𝐸Π𝑐 =   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
 
 
where 𝑐  as subscript characterizes centralization and 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  indicates the level of output 
under asymmetric information .In the three-layer hierarchy, the agent is always a nonfamily 
member, so that the type of agent remains always unknown to the principal when there is no 
supervisor  . Thus, this is also the level of performance of the agent when the signal of the 
supervisor is not informative, i.e.  σ = ∅  with probability (1 – ζ ). 
With a truthful supervisor, the expected profit for the principal is: 
𝐸Π𝑑 = 𝜁   𝑣 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  − 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  ) 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
+  1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
 
where d as subscript stands for decentralization and 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  is the level of output when σ =θ 
with probability ζ. Thus, the expected profit is greater under delegation than under 
centralization when the following inequality holds : 
  𝑣 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  − 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  ) 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
>   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
 
 
 
Since we have 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  ≥  𝑞𝜙 𝜃   ∀ θ∈ Ω  and  ∂c/∂θ > 0, the previous inequality holds and thus 
we arrive at the result that   𝐸Π𝑑  >  𝐸Π𝑐  . QED 
 
           Let us comment this result. When the supervisor is a family member, the principal acts 
as an altruist since he maximizes the utility function defined as the sum Π+βV (s). Since the 
supervisor always reports truthfully, he receives a wage s = 0 and hence V (s) = 0. As a 
consequence, if the principal has a family member who behaves as a trusty supervisor, the 
principal would always hire this family member under delegation. However, assuming a 
complete sainthood of supervisor is an extreme case, even with the focus on family members. 
Indeed, the use of preference shaping mechanisms is costly, and this cost may lead to only a 
partial honesty of family members. The role of personnel characteristics on hiring is further 
examined in Lazear (1995). Given the possibility of bribery due to imperfect honesty, we 
have to examine the behavior of the principal when collusion between the supervisor and the 
agent occurs. 
 
5 The Pattern of Optimal Collusion 
We now suppose the presence of a supervisor of type ψ in a setting of perfect information. 
The type of supervisor is perfectly known by the principal. Hence, in order to deter collusion 
between the agent of type θ and the supervisor of type ψ, the principal takes into account the 
collusion-proofness constraint which may be expressed as : 
                                                s(θ)  ≥    u(θ) − ψ                                                                    (13) 
where s(θ) is the wage offered to the supervisor when reporting σ = θ, and u(θ) − ψ is the net 
gain when the agent of type θ characterized by the informational rent u(θ) bribes the 
supervisor. The latter accepts the side contract if and only if the net benefit expected from 
collusion is greater than the level of wage proposed by the principal. Therefore, the principal 
does not leave scope for collusion with the following salary: 
                                              𝑠 𝜃 = 𝑢 𝜃 − 𝑢 𝜃0                                                             (14) 
where  ψ = 𝑢 𝜃0 . Using the definition of u(θ), we can write ψ as : 
                                              𝜓 =   
𝜕𝑐  𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃0
 𝑑𝑥                                                              (15) 
We are now in a position to characterize occurrence of collusion in this model. 
Corollary 2  
The principal offers a lower wage to the supervisor when the psychological cost ψ is 
important. Since the supervisor is corruptible with probability Pr (θ ≤ 𝜃0 (ψ)) = F (𝜃0(ψ)) 
more honest supervisors deter occurrence of collusion.  
         Thus, a supervisor of type ψ is tempted to collude with the more efficient types of 
agents, whose informational rent u(θ) is sufficiently important to bribe the supervisor's 
honesty. However, the principal is aware of the proportion of agents who are able to make the 
supervisor against his primary objective, namely to make an honest report when discovering 
agents. Clearly, F(𝜃0(ψ)) is a decreasing function of the parameter  ψ . Indeed, using equation  
( 15) , it follows that : 
                                                     
𝑑𝜃0  
𝑑𝜓
=  − 
𝜕𝑐 𝜃0(𝜓),𝑞 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 
−1
< 0 
 
 
        Our analysis sheds light on the role of culture and preference shaping within the family. 
As a prediction, collusion is less probable when the supervisor hires a family member, in 
particular with a child given the stronger parent-child ties and interactions. The parent is 
induced to hire the most able child. During childhood, parents have the opportunity to 
inculcate an honest behavior (either trusty or altruistic) in their children. Some authors have 
shown that even large organizations attempt to cultivate corporate culture (Cremer, 1993, 
Kreps, 1990, Hermalin, 2001). The role of corporate culture is to have a better control over 
employees, by instilling in them feelings of loyalty and integrity (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). 
In so doing, it is possible for large organizations where the turnover rate is low to experience 
more success in shaping behavior (Akerlof, 1983, Mulligan, 1997). 
Proposition 6  
The collusion proofness is given by the following  allocations : 
i)        ∀𝜃 ≤ 𝜃0 , 𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+  1 − 𝛽 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 1 +  1 − 𝛽 
𝜁 .
1−𝜁 .
  
ii)        ∀𝜃 > 𝜃0  , 𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+  1 − 𝛽 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 1 +  1 − 𝛽 
𝜁 .
1−𝜁 .
𝐹(𝜃0)
𝑓(𝜃)
  
Proof :  
When the preferences of the supervisor are known by the principal, the level of well-being for 
the principal Σ is defined by : 
     Σ =  1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) − 𝑢 𝜃  𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
+ 𝜁   𝑣 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  −
𝜃
𝜃
𝑐𝜃,𝑞𝜃𝜃−𝑠𝜃+𝛽𝑉(𝑠𝜃)𝑑𝐹𝜃 
 
The first term of the sum is when the supervisor has no information about the type of agent, so 
that σ = r = ∅ and hence s(∅) = 0. According to second term of the sum, the supervisor is 
rewarded with s(θ) for reporting r = θ when σ = θ (with probability ζ), and the parameter β 
indicates the intensity of altruism given by the principal to the supervisor. In addition, we 
have V (s) = s, the side payment 𝑠 𝜃 = 𝑢 𝜃 − 𝑢 𝜃0  can be expressed as: 
                                      𝑠 𝜃 =   
𝜕𝑐 𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃0
𝜃
 𝑑𝑥 
and the threshold value 𝜃0 is such that  𝜓 =   
𝜕𝑐  𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃0
 𝑑𝑥.  
Thus, for the sake of simplicity ,we drop θ as an argument in the notation of the following  the 
expected welfare for the principal is : 
𝐸𝚺 =  1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 +
𝜃0
𝜃
 
 1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 +
𝜃
𝜃0
 
𝜁   𝑣 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  − 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  ) − (1 − 𝛽)
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 +
𝜃0
𝜃
 
                             𝜁   𝑣 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  − 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  ) − 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃0
 
     
Now, the problem for the principal is to solve : 
 Max(𝜃0 ,𝑞𝜃  . )    𝐸 Σ 
 s.t    𝜓 =   
𝜕𝑐 𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃0
 𝑑𝑥 
Let L be the corresponding Lagrangian, such that : 
L = EΣ − λ 
𝜕𝑐  𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
1
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜃
𝜃0      
 𝑑𝐹(𝜃) 
where λ is the multiplicator associated to the constraint   𝜓 =   
𝜕𝑐  𝑥 ,𝑞(𝑥) 
𝜕𝑥
𝜃
𝜃0
 𝑑𝑥.The first order 
condition ∂L/∂𝜃0 = 0 is : 
                                    −𝜁 1 − 𝛽 
𝐹 𝜃0 
𝑓 𝜃0 
𝜕𝑐 𝜃0 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃
0  
𝜕𝜃
+ 𝜆
𝑐 𝜃0 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃
0  
𝜕𝜃
1
𝑓(𝜃0)
 
so that we obtain : 
λ = (1 − β)ζ F(𝜃0) > 0 
Let us substitute this expression and then, by maximizing over 𝑞𝜙 .   we arrive at the 
following result: 
    
𝐸𝚺 =  1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃0
𝜃
−  𝜁   (1 − 𝛽)
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃0
𝜃
 
 
+ 1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  ) −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 +
𝜃
𝜃0
 
−𝜁   (1 − 𝛽)
𝐹(𝜃0)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃0
 
             
 
From ∂L/∂𝑞𝜙  = 0, we deduce that: 
  ∀𝜃 ≤ 𝜃0 , 𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+  1 − 𝛽 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 1 +  1 − 𝛽 
𝜁 .
1−𝜁 .
    and 
    𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+  1 − 𝛽 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 1 +  1 − 𝛽 
𝜁 .
1−𝜁 .
𝐹(𝜃0)
𝑓(𝜃)
   when the 
nequality θ > 𝜃0 holds. QED 
 
What is the meaning of this collusion proofness allocation ? When there is no supervisor, the 
optimal solution is  given by : 
   𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐(𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞(𝜃)
+
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞(𝜃)
 
In the centralization case, the marginal benefit    𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃    is equalized with the sum of the 
marginal cost of production  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
   and the informational marginal cost  
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 . 
We can note that a same result is reached with a saint-supervisor, who always reports 
truthfully the information. Indeed, with σ = θ ∈ Ω, we have r = σ with probability ζ. The 
supervisor receives s = 0 and the principal implements 𝑞𝜃 .    such that :    𝑣
′ 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  =
 
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜃  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 . This is the first-best solution. But if σ = ∅, the report is r = ∅ with probability 
(1−ζ), so that the principal implements 𝑞𝜙 .   which is given by : 
    𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 
This is the second-best solution, which allows a rent extraction of the less inefficient type of 
agent. 
Now, let us denote by Γ(θ, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃 )) the net marginal benefit for the principal : 
                Γ(θ,𝑞𝜙 𝜃 )) =     𝑣
′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  −  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
−
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 
which allows us to examine the collusion proof solution. Using the definition of Γ(θ, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃 )), 
we can write the optimal conditions given in proposition 2 as follows : 
              Γ0  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  1 − 𝛽 
𝜁
1−𝜁
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
        ∀𝜃 ≤ 𝜃0 
              Γ1  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  1 − 𝛽 
𝜁
1−𝜁
𝐹(𝜃0)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
       ∀𝜃 > 𝜃0 
    
There are two regimes for the efficiency type θ, i.e. Ω0 = [𝜃;𝜃
0] and Ω1 =]𝜃
0; 𝜃]. Let us recall 
that the type of supervisor ψ is corruptible when he encounters the type of agents θ ≤ 𝜃0, 
whose proportion is given by F(𝜃0).This is a general result with respect to the previous 
contributions of Tirole (1986, 1992), since there are a continuum of type θ ∈ Ω and a 
continuum of type ψ in our model. Hence, one expects a greater threat of collusion in the first 
regime Ω0. Since the aim of the principal is to deter this collusion, the principal has to 
decrease the stake of collusion which corresponds to the informational rent for the agent when 
the supervisor hides his information. 
Therefore, since collusion is more probable in Ω0, the principal has to distort more the 
allocation in this interval, with a reduced performance level. In other words, the performance 
in Ω0 is such that the net marginal benefit for the principal  Γ0  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃   is equalized with 
the marginal cost of collusion between the ψ type of supervisor and the θ type of agent θ ∈ 
Ω0, which is given by  1 − 𝛽 
𝜁
1−𝜁
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 .So, in Ω0, avoiding collusion leads the 
principal to bribe the supervisor for reporting honestly the information, and such a measure is 
costly. As a consequence, more distortion in performance asked for agents is desirable, since 
it decreases the value of the informational rent and lessens the stake of collusion. We also 
note that i) the need for supervision is useless when ζ = 0 , ii) the possibility of distortion 
associated to the threat of collusion disappears when β = 1 (perfect altruism) since ∂𝑞𝜙 𝜃 /∂β 
> 0 and the supervisor's salary is not costly, and iii) ζ /(1−ζ) is a measure of the likelihood of 
collusion, 
𝐹(𝜃0)
𝑓(𝜃)
 is a sort of likelihood of being in the interval Ω1 = ]𝜃
0; 𝜃]. 
 
Now, let us consider the second regime with θ >𝜃0. Given the previous definitions of 
Γ0  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃   and Γ1  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃       , we can write the following equivalence : 
Γ1  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =
𝐹(𝜃0)
𝑓(𝜃)
Γ0  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃        for all   θ >𝜃
0 
 
Since the ratio 
𝐹(𝜃0)
𝑓(𝜃)
 is always strictly lower than one, there is less distortion in the second 
regime. Indeed, in that case, it is less likely that a supervisor of type ψ collude with agents for 
Ω1 = ]𝜃
0; 𝜃] since the latter receive lower informational rent. 
 
         So far, we have analyzed the response of the principal to the potential collusion between 
the agent and the supervisor, whose preferences are perfectly known by the principal. This is 
more likely to be the case of a supervisor as a family member. We now examine the optimal 
grand contract when the preferences of the supervisor are unknown to the principal, which is 
more likely when the principal hires a nonfamily member. 
 
 
6 Covert Transfer Under Asymmetric Information 
Changing the information structure between the agent and the supervisor, we consider a 
setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not 
know the type of supervisor when proposing a side contract. The supervisor may be seen as a 
perfect stranger to the firm. In this situation, we have to solve a problem of collusion with side 
payment under imperfect information. 
          When σ = θ ∈ Ω, what is the condition for a supervisor to conceal information ? If we 
denote by s(θ) the wage offered by the principal to the supervisor when the latter reports the 
observed signal and b(θ) the amount of covert transfer from the agent to the supervisor, the 
supervisor of type ψ accepts the side contract offered by the agent if and only if the net benefit 
expected from collusion is greater than the wage proposed by the principal. Thus, the 
following condition must hold for the covert transfer b(θ) : 
                                                   b(θ) − ψ ≥ s(θ)                                                               (16) 
In this setting, the type ψ of supervisor is unknown. We assume that the parameter ψ is the 
realization of a random variable characterized by the density function φ(ψ) and the 
distribution function Φ(ψ) on the support Ω = [0;1]. To get closed forms solutions, we further 
assume that the distribution function has the following form : 
                                                     Φ(ψ) =  𝜓𝜖                                                                      (17) 
with 0 ≤ 𝜖  ≤ 1. Given the definition of Φ(ψ) and using (16), the probability that a coalition 
between the agent and the supervisor occurs may be expressed as : 
                             Pr (ψ ≤ b(θ) − s(θ))   =     Φ(b(θ) − s(θ))                                               (18) 
where (b(θ)−s(θ)) indicates the surplus of the coalition. We note that the frequency of 
collusive behavior has a standard form in our problem. Indeed, the supervisor is more likely to 
accept a side contract from the agent when the latter offers a high value for the covert transfer. 
Conversely, the probability of collusion is a decreasing function of the level of wage paid by 
the principal to the supervisor. 
The agent maximizes the following net expected utility : 
                            Max Φ(b(θ)−s(θ))[u(θ)−b(θ)]                                                          (19) 
Since the agent has no information about the type ψ of supervisor and since a truthful 
revelation by the supervisor to the principal lowers the agent's rent, the agent offers the 
following amount of covert transfer b(θ) to the supervisor given the distribution function  : 
Φ(ψ) =  𝜓𝜖  
Proposition 7  
Under asymmetric information, the optimal side transfer from the agent to the supervisor is 
given by the following amount: 
                                              𝑏 𝜃 =  
𝜖
1+𝜖
 𝑢 𝜃 +
1
1+𝜖
 𝑠(𝜃) 
 
        With uncertainty about the type of supervisor, the agent proposes a side contract which 
induces the supervisor to misreport the signal to the principal. When the supervisor accepts 
the transaction with the agent, the optimal covert transfer is a linear combination of the rent 
u(θ) obtained by the agent and the wage s(θ) offered by the principal. The share of the agent's 
rent received by the supervisor is an increasing function of the fraction 
𝜖
1+𝜖
. This latter value 
corresponds to the mean level of the psychic cost ψ for the supervisor, since we have E(ψ) = 
𝜖
1+𝜖
. Since the probability of collusion is Pr(ψ ≤ b(θ) −s(θ)) and using the optimal covert 
transfer of proposition 7, we obtain the following equality 𝑏 𝜃 − 𝑠(𝜃) =  
𝜖
1+𝜖
( 𝑢 𝜃 −
 𝑠(𝜃)) . 
 
Corollary 3  
  Given the covert transfer, the optimal probability of collusion under asymmetric information 
is :                            Φ(
𝜖
1+𝜖
( 𝑢 𝜃 −  𝑠(𝜃)) =    
𝜖
1+𝜖
( 𝑢 𝜃 −  𝑠(𝜃) 
𝜖
 
 
         Collusion between the two parties is more likely when the retention of information by 
the supervisor benefits the agent. It is an increasing function of the rent u(θ) since ∂Φ/∂u(θ) > 
0. Besides, the probability of collusion is lowered by the level of salary offered by the 
principal to the supervisor, since the bribe becomes less attractive for the supervisor with 
∂Φ/∂s(θ) < 0. An additional comment concerns the interpretation of  , which is an indicator of 
the elasticity of collusion between the supervisor and the agent. In our framework, the 
monetary value of the agent's collusive activity is endogenous. 
The parameter 𝜖  is equivalent to the shadow cost λ of the lateral side transfer for the agent as 
defined in Laffont and Tirole (1993, chapter 11), using the equivalence λ = 1/ 𝜖 . Since the 
probability of collusion may be expressed as Φ((u(θ)−s(θ))/ 1+λ ), we have lim λ→∞ Φ(.) = 0, 
meaning that an infinite shadow cost for the agent's transfer prevents from collusive behavior 
among a three-tier hierarchy. 
 
Corollary 4   
The Collusion proofness requires   s(θ) = u(θ)   ∀θ ∈ Ω. 
 
Using corollary 3, it is easy to see that no collusion occurs when s(θ) = u(θ). So, what happens 
when the principal hires a nonfamily member as a supervisor? We remark that the collusion 
proofness is more costly since the equality s(θ) = u(θ) holds   (∀θ ∈ Ω). 
This corresponds to a transfer of informational rent from the agent to the supervisor. As a 
consequence, it is in the interest for an ownership to include family members in the 
management of the corporation. While it is often argued that supervision by family members 
can be perceived as nepotism, we offer a different interpretation using the theory on 
incentives contracting. The rational of hiring supervisors among family members is simply the 
result of the reduced agency problem, in that it avoids collusive behaviors between 
supervisors and agents. 
 
Proposition 8  
The Collusion proofness in presence of a nonfamily supervisor requires the implementation of  
the following production  allocation given by : 
                           𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 1 +
𝜁 .
1−𝜁 .
     ∀𝜃 ∈ Ω 
 
Proof :  
A mechanism that is robust to collusive behavior requires s(θ) = u(θ). Since the supervisor is 
not a family member, the principal is no longer characterized by an altruistic behavior towards 
the supervisor and thus β = 0.  
We can now calculate the expected profit for the principal as follows : 
     𝐸Π =  1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑢(𝜃) 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 +
𝜃
𝜃
 𝜁   𝑣 𝑞𝜃 𝜃  −
𝜃
𝜃
𝑐𝜃,𝑞𝜃𝜃−𝑠(𝜃)𝑑𝐹𝜃 
so that the principal solves the following maximization over la quantity of production   
𝑞𝜙 𝜃  problem : 
Max
𝑞𝜙  . 
 1 − 𝜁   𝑣  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  − 𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  −
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
−  𝜁   
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕𝑐  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  
𝜕𝜃
 𝑑𝐹 𝜃 
𝜃
𝜃
 
which leads to  : 
                        𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =  
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
+
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 1 +
𝜁 .
1−𝜁 .
       ∀𝜃 ∈ Ω .  QED 
 
For the interpretation, we use the function Γ(θ, q∅), so that the previous solution can be 
expressed as : 
                           Γ  𝜃, 𝑞𝜙 𝜃  =   
𝜁
1−𝜁
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
  ,  ∀𝜃 ∈ Ω 
 
So, in the presence of an unknown supervisor, the principal is expected to distort more the 
performance asked to the agent along all the interval Ω. The distortion whose amount is given 
by 
𝜁
1−𝜁
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
  does not depend on the altruism parameter β. Moreover, it prevails for 
all type θ ∈ Ω. Conversely, under perfect information about the supervisor, the degree of 
altruism alleviates the distortion. As a consequence, the presence of an outsider supervisor 
entails a lower degree of performance within the firm. A final comment is the interpretation of 
the solution given in proposition 8. The marginal benefit   𝑣 ′  𝑞𝜙 𝜃  is equalized with the 
sum of the marginal cost 
𝜕𝑐 (𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃 )
𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
  , the marginal cost of rent without collusion 
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 and the weighted marginal cost of avoiding collusion  
𝜁
1−𝜁
𝐹(𝜃)
𝑓(𝜃)
𝜕²𝑐 𝜃 ,𝑞𝜙  𝜃  
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑞 (𝜃)
 . 
Thus, our analysis may be seen as a direct generalization of the results obtained by Laffont 
and Tirole (1993) on collusion in regulation policies contexts. 
 
 
 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have attempted to embed altruism in the context of the firm theory. Our 
central assumption is that altruism operates only in family firms. Parents are especially 
generous to their children not only because they love them, but also because their own level of 
well-being would decline if they acted in any different way as demonstrated by Becker 
(1991). Conversely, altruism is not present in a non-family business organization, and the 
ownership of a firm is only concerned with the maximization of the firm's profit in that case. 
Interestingly, non-family firms are often tempted to imitate family firms, in particular by 
promoting and 'producing' altruism through corporate culture (Hermalin, 2001). Our 
contribution is to show what role information plays in the presence of altruism in such 
hierarchical models of production. 
 
       Specifically, we show how altruism influences agency relationships in family firms. 
Altruism greatly helps to explain why the performance of family firms is often different from 
performance of other types of business organizations. Indeed, agency relationships are 
embedded in the strength of parent-child relationships. As pointed out by Pollak (1985), the 
main advantages of family governance are right incentives (claims on family resources), 
monitoring (owing to proximity), altruism and loyalty. Also, altruism compels parents to take 
care for their children and foster commitment to family firms. Specifically, this paper 
illustrates the claim of Simon (1993), according to whom altruism is expected to substantially 
change the theory of the firm. 
 
       Our results are two folds. On the one hand, we show that altruism only matters in a 
context of asymmetric information to determine the optimal production contract. Under 
symmetric information, no differences are expected between family and non-family firms, but 
the prevalent setting when dealing with production problems involves agency problems. On 
the other hand, we demonstrate that the issue of decentralization of information within a 
hierarchy matters when explaining the differential performances of the firms. Non-family 
firms have to devote more resources to the coordination of information within the hierarchical 
structure given the threat of collusion between members having relevant information. As a 
consequence, such private hierarchical firms would be less productive in terms of financial 
and innovation performances. 
        
        Finally, our analysis highlights the necessity to account jointly for social interactions 
within the firm and information aspects. So far, several studies have pointed out the role of 
altruism and trust both in the family and in the workplace (Mulligan, 1997, Rotemberg, 1994), 
but less attention has been devoted to their effects on the performance of firms. Our 
theoretical analysis, which is a contribution to the emerging formal literature on family 
business (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001, 2002, Chami, 2001) indicates that family ties 
may be good in terms of performance for the development of large firms. We believe that the 
expected positive impact of family altruistic relationships on the firm's performance is 
undoubtedly a central factor when explaining why family businesses are still the predominant 
form of business organization around the world. 
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